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RECENT DECISIONS
cation caused him to commit suicide. 24 In this area we see the courts extending
liability beyond the normal rules of causation to enforce the legislature's desire
to discourage this type of activity.
It would appear from a study of the cases in this area that the courts,
realizing that "proximate cause" was an inadequate test in determining defend-
ant's liability, limited its effect in certain cases by adopting the "irresistible
impulse" test of the Daniels.case to serve as an escape hatch from harsh and
unjust results. However, the latter test is inadequate also, because of the practi-
cal difficulty of determining the victim's state of mind at the time of the suicide.
Therefore, it seems that courts, instead of wrestling with the nebulous concepts
of "proximate cause" and "irresistible impulse", would contribute much toward
clarifying this area of law by acknowledging the fact that suicide is a remote
consequence, to which liability should attach only where public policy and
common sense dictates that liability should attach. This would require a clear
pronouncement by the courts of the type of acts that would allow liability to
be imposed for the remote consequence of suicide. It seems that this should be
limited to acts which are intentionally wrongful or criminal. This does not
preclude the courts from finding suicide too remote a consequence for certain
criminal or intentionally wrongful acts. It merely limits the imposition of liability
to this narrowed area. Under this analysis the Court was apparently correct
in the instant case in overruling defendant's demurrer since the act of conversion
is an intentionally wrongful act. However, the courts should recognize a more
practical basis of liability instead of subjecting plaintiffs to the difficult task of
proving such things as irresistible impulse."
JAMES M. BUCKLEY
ADMISSIBILITY OF A PLEA OF GUILTY TO A TRAFFc INFRACTION IN A CIVIL
SuIT BASED ON THE SAME FACTS
"... A traffic infraction is not a crime, and the penalty or punish-
ment imposed therefore shall not be deemed for any purpose a penal
or criminal penalty or punishment, and shall not affect or impair the
credibility as a witness, or otherwise, of any person convicted there-
fore."'
Since Schindler v. Royal Insurance Co.,2 New York courts have permitted
the admission of a prior criminal conviction, when logically relevant in a civil
suit as prina facie evidence of the facts upon which it is based. However,
traffic infractions, not being classified as crimes in New York, have been the
24. See, Anno. 11 A.L.R.2d 751, 765.
1. New York Vehicle & Traffic Law, § 2(29). It must be pointed out that some
traffic violations are not infractions but come under the heading of misdemeanors or
felonies.
2. 258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711 (1932).
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subject of much confusion and uncertainty in the law of evidence.2 Walther v.
News Syndicate Co.4 held that a record of conviction for a traffic infraction
after trial on a plea of not guilty is inadmissible as evidence against a de-
fendant in a civil action arising out of that traffic infraction. That Court, by
way of dictum, said that where there is a plea of guilty to a traffic infraction,
it may be admitted in a civil suit as a declaration or admission against interest.
Since that time, trial courts have enforced this dictum, and it has been referred
to in further dicta by lower courts.5 The validity of this dictum has been
directly raised in Ando v. Woodberry,0 where the First Department in a three-
two decision repudiated it and held a plea of guilty to a traffic infraction is in-
admissible in a civil action arising out of that infraction.
New York, as early as 1820,7 departed from the general prevalent
view8 that a conviction in a criminal action could not be brought into evidence
to establish the truth of the facts on which it was rendered in a subsequent
civil action where relevant. Jurisdictions that do not allow the conviction to
be brought into evidence base their rule of exclusion on some or all of the
following reasons: dissimilarity in objects, in issues, in results, in procedures,
or in parties in the two actions, as well as a lack of privity and mutualityp
It has also been argued that the principal obstacles to admissibility are the
hearsay and opinion rules.10 Virginia has formulated a separate rule by ad-
mitting a previous conviction as conclusive evidence, giving to it the force of
an estoppel, where a convicted criminal attempts to take advantage of a
"right" which arose with the crime that he committed." The modern trend is
toward the admittance of the prior conviction as persuasive evidence.
12
The New York law of admitting convictions in a criminal case for their
probative value in a civil suit arising out of the same facts can be condensed
into the following rules:
3. Stanton v. Major, 274 App. Div. 864, 82 N.Y.S.2d 134 (3d Dep't 1948); Roach v.
Yonkers R.R. Co., 242 App. Div. 195, 271 N.Y. Supp. 289 (2d Dep't 1934); Same v.
Davison, 253 App. Div. 193, 1 N.Y.S.2d 374 (4th Dep't 1937).
4. 276 App. Div. 169, 93 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1st Dep't 1949).
5. People v. Formato, 286 App. Div. 357, 363-364, 143 N.Y.S.2d 205, 211 (3d Dcp't
1955), aff'd 309 N.Y. 979, 132 N.E.2d 894 (1956); Michitsch v. Stimfel, 7 Misc. 2d 960,
164 N.YS.2d 246 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
6. 9 A.D.2d 125, 192 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1st Dep't 1959).
7. Maybee v. Avery, 18 Johns (N.Y.) 352 (1820).
8. Chantango v. Abaroa, 218 U.S. 476 (1910); Carlisle v. Killebrew, 89 Ala. 329, 6
So. 756 (1889); Horn v. Cole, 203 Ark. 361, 156 S.W.2d 787 (1941); Silva v. Silva, 297
Mass. 217, 7 N.E.2d 601 (1937); Summers v. Bergner & Engle Brewing Co., 143 Pa. 114, 22
Atl. 707 (1891).
9. 30A Am. Jur. judgments § 475 (1958).
10. Hinton, Judgment of Conviction; Effect on a Civil Case, 27 I1. L. Rev. 195
(1932). This reasoning was challenged in 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1671(a) (3d Ed. 1940).
11. Eagle Star & British Dominion Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314
(1927); See Note 39 Va. L. Rev. 995 (1953). Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N.Y. 310,
179 N.E. 711 (1932) suggested that the New York Legislature codify this rule but the New
York Law Revision Commission ruled against it.
12. Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951); Sovereign
Camp, W. 0. W. v. Gunn, 229 Ala. 508, 158 So. 192 (1934); Tucker v. Tucker, 101 N.J.
Eq. 72, 137 At. 404 (1927).
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(a) a conviction of a crime is primz facie evidence of the facts on
which it was based. 13
(b) an acquittal in a prior action is excluded from being offered in
proof for the reason that in a conviction there is a finding that
the accused has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
but an acquittal is simply a holding that prosecution has failed
to discharge this burden.14
(c) A plea of guilty in a criminal action is admissible as an admis-
sion against interest.' 5
(d) A plea of nolo contendere'8 is not allowed in New York.' 7
Where does the conviction on a traffic infraction fit into the overall pic-
ture? Beside giving a traffic infraction a special place in the realm of statutory
violations,18 the New York Legislature has seen fit to distinguish the traffic
infraction from other offenses by providing that a witness shall not "be required
to disclose a conviction for a traffic infraction, as defined by the vehicle and
traffic law, nor shall conviction therefor affect the credibility of such witness in
any action or proceeding."'19 The majority in the instant case recognizing that
this provision "relating to 'convictions' (does) not govern the admissibility of
pleas' of guilty to traffic infractions in civil actions- as admissions against inter-
est," went on to adopt the reasoning of the Walther case2° (which Court, in turn,
based its reasoning on Hart v. Mealey) 21 to the effect that since "By the
enactment of. .. Section 355 of the Civil Practice Act... the legislature recog-
nized the weakness of a traffic infraction as proof of facts which may have been
involved", this was an expression of public policy 22 which seems to go beyond
the mere question of privilege or credibility of a witness and shows that a plea
in a traffic court to a traffic infraction "is utterly lacking in probative value."
By pointing out the differences between traffic infractions and other
crimes, the Court in the instant case was able to dismiss a prior holding of the
Fourth Department in Same v. Davison 3 which held that defendant's convic-
tion on a plea of guilty to a traffic infraction was admissible in a negligence
action arising out of the same occurrence as prima facie evidence of the facts.
In the Same case, the Court merely cited the Schindler case as authority and
13. Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., supra note 11.
14. Only a preponderance of the evidence is necessary in a dvil suit. However, the
failure of the State to prove guilt may show some evidence that the accused was in fact
not guilty. See Feinstein v. Brooklyn Edison Co., 42 N.YS.2d 16 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
15. Stanton v. Major, supra note 3, in which there was a prior conviction of reckless
driving which is a misdemeanor under Section 58 of the New York Vehicle & Traffic Law.
16. A plea of isolo contendere is a plea of guilt only for the purposes of the action
where pleaded.
17. People v. Daiboch, 265 N.Y. 125, 191 N.E. 859 (1934).
18. Supra note 1.
19. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 355.
20. Supra note 4.
21. 287 N.Y. 39, 38 N.E.2d 121 (1941).
22. See Sims v. Union News Co, 284 App. Div. 335, 131 N.YS.2d 837 (1st Dep't
1954), where the court said "The case of the traffic infraction occupies a special place of
its own; and under the public policy of the State it has no effect beyond the immediate
motor vehicle penalty or disability incurred."
23. Supra note 3.
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did not distinguish between the conviction of a traffic infraction and that of a
crimeP4 Since the Schindler case applied only to prior criminal convictions, it
was unjustified to use it as controlling authority for the admissibility of a
traffic infraction conviction.
In the Walther case, the First Department squarely faced the issue of
whether the fact of a conviction for a traffic infraction after trial on a not
guilty plea is admissible against a defendant in a civil suit arising out of the
same occurrence. The Court felt that evidence of a conviction of violating a
traffic regulation would be "likely to impair the right of a defendant to a fair
trial on the issue of civil negligence." This would also be contrary to the public
policy espoused as to traffic violations which has previously been aluded to in
this note.
The Court in the Ando decision thought that the significance of the
Walther case "is that every one of the grounds supplied why a traffic conviction
after trial should not be admissible applies equally to the plea of guilty in a
traffic infraction case."
Before we approach the problem of what weight an impartial jury would
give, or should give, to a guilty plea to a traffic violation, let us examine what
weight does the average motorist give to an appearance before court on a traffic
violation. Many times a plea of guilty is the most convenient form for the
busy defendant-regardless of whether he believes he is guilty or not. A New
York City Traffic Court magistrate has estimated that forty percent of the
motorists who appeared in his court pleaded guilty despite the fact that they
honestly believed they were innocent. 25 An accused finds it difficult to produce
evidence that creates a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, and, therefore, for
the sake of expediency a guilty plea is entered 26
Many defendants feel that they do not have a chance to prove their
innocence. Judges, in the hustle and bustle of today's life spend little time in
evaluating a defendant's plea and reaching a decision.m2 7 Illustrating the pres-
sures prevalent in our metropolitan traffic courts, a leading authority has writ-
ten, "The evidence of police officers and witnesses alike was cut short, de-
fendants were waved away by the judge while still giving their excuses and the
judgment of the court was given with one eye on the clock. This type of trial
all too often left convicted defendants with the impression that they never had
a chance."28 That a defendant will usually make a plea rather than stand
trial is borne out by the following statistics of the dispositions of courts of
24. Supra note 2.
25. Sontheimer, Traffic Courts-Blot on American Justice, McCall's, June 1956, p. 27.
26. A Baltimore traffic judge has stated that ninety-five percent of his cases enter
pleas of guilty. Scherr, Teen Age Traffic Court, 31 Transactions, National Safety Congress,
56 (1952).
27. Nearthon, Fair Trial in Traffic Court, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 577 (1957).
28. Warren, Traffic Courts (1942), the fourth volume in the Judicial Administration
series. In regard to the time to be allotted to an individual, defendant, Warren cites the
all time record for hearing cases--one New York City Magistrate heard 1016 cases in two
and one-half hours!
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inferior jurisdiction in cities in New York State (outside the City of New
York) for the period July 1, 1958 through July 1, 1959. Of the 487,102
motor vehicle offenses which were heard, 458,710 or 94 percent were disposed
of by pleas, whereas only 2,514 were disposed of by trial and 25,878 were
dismissed before completion of trial2 9
The above discussion of the problems facing an accused violator on his
appearance in traffic court is not meant to be a full discussion of the problems
inherent in that court. It is merely meant to point up the probative value of
the guilty plea when it is later brought into evidence at a civil trial. An at-
tempt was made to point out that a plea of guilty does not necessarily mean
that the defendant was guilty of the alleged traffic infraction.
Guilty pleas to traffic infractions have been admitted30 and excluded 3'
in subsequent civil proceedings in other jurisdictions. Some states have enacted
statutes which prohibit the admissibility of evidence of a prior traffic convic-
tion in a subsequent civil suit.32 Cases interpreting these statutes have held
that a plea of guilty to a traffic conviction is deservant of the same weight as
a conviction after a plea of not guilty and therefore should be excluded. 33
Should a defendant be held to an admission of guilt in all subsequent
proceedings in respect to the facts involved? If the plea is admitted, it does
not establish the fact of the violation, but it is an admission of the party that
the fact is true.34 Where a guilty plea is introduced, it may be explained.3 5
However, the danger lies in the fact that a jury will give a prior conviction so
much weight as to be prejudicial. It must be conceded that the probative value
of a guilty plea to a traffic infraction is small. Whenever we admit evidence to
go to the jury we assume that the general knowledge and experience of a jury
will enable them to rationalize as to the probative effect of the proffered evi-
dence. But where the plea of guilty is allowed in evidence, the courts may
very well be haunted with the thought that the jury will give it so much weight
as to be prejudciial. And if there is any miscarriage of justice in traffic court,
it would work a double hardship to give this adjudication any weight whatever
in a subsequent civil proceeding. It should also be pointed out that the decision
of the Court in the instant case is a necessary and logical extension of the
Waltl er decision, for it seems to be unreasonable to require a defendant to
29. 5th Annual Report of the judicial Conference, Table 32 (1960).
30. 01k v. Marquardt, 203 Wis. 479, 234 N.W. 773 (1931); Weiss v. Wasserman, 91
N.H. 164, 15 A.2d 861 (1940); Kock v. Elkins, 71 Ida. 50, 225 P.2d 457 (1950).
31. Zenuck v. Johnson, 114 Conn. 383, 158 Atl. 910 (1932); Sothern v. Van Dyke,
114 N.J.L. 1, 174 At. 877 (1934).
32. Minn. St. 1941, § 169.94(1) and (2). Utah CA. 1953, § 41-6-170. Colorado R.S.
1953, § 13-4-140.
33. Warren v. Marsh, 215 Minn. 615, 11 N.W.2d 528 (1943); Utah Farm Bureau
Ins. Co. v. Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 315 P.2d 277 (1957) ; Ripple v. Brack, 132 Col. 226, 286
P.2d 625 (1955).
34. Lipmann Bros. Inc. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 149 Me. 199, 100 A.2d
246 (1953).
35. Race v. Chappell, 304 Ky. 788, 202 S.W.2d 626 (1947); Morrissey v. Powell, 304
Mass. 268, 23 N.E.2d 411 (1939).
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vigorously defend what he considers to be a hopeless cause solely for the reason
that in this way he will be assured that his being found guilty to a traffic in-
fraction will not be brought into evidence in a later civil suit.
The Court in the instant case has cast aside legal niceties in order to
render a decision that is significant in its practical approach to a problem that
has harrassed many civil magistrates, not to mention countless defense counsel.
In the harsh realities of today's courtroom procedure, technical concepts must
give way to practical solutions, and Ando v. Woodberry does just that.
JOSEPH M. AUGUSTINE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY: PROSECUTION FOR UNDERLYING FELONY FOLLOWING
ACQUITTAL FOR FELONY-M-IURDER.
The petitioner, in People ex rel. Santangelo v. Tutuska,' brought a writ of
habeas corpus while awaiting trial for burglary and attempted robbery. He
based his writ on the ground that the charges in the indictment would subject
him to double jeopardy, in that he had previously been tried and acquitted
of murder in the first degree on a felony-murder theory in which indictment
the underlying felonies were the burglary and robbery for which he was
presently indicted.
In New York the prohibition against twice placing an individual in peril
for a single offense is embodied in several provisions of the law.2 Since it has
been held that Section 1938 of the Penal Law embodies, 3 if not perhaps extends,
the constitutional immunity against double jeopardy,4 the Court considered
and rejected the petitioner's contention under that section. The Court dismissed
petitioner's writ holding that robbery or burglary, unlike assault which is
inherent in every murder, is a separate and distinct crime, a crime that may be
committed without committing the crime of murder.
Although courts agree that to try a defendant twice for the same offense
is deplorable, they have considerable difficulty, due to the large number of
statutory offenses, in determining whether or not given sets of facts supporting
two or more charges are, in law, the same offense.5
Section 1938 prohibits not only a second prosecution for the same offense,
1. 19 Misc. 2d 308, 192 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
2. N.Y. Const., art. 1, § 6, "No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense"; N.Y. Code of Crim. Proc. § 9, "No person can be subject to a
second prosecution for a crime for which be has been prosecuted and duly convicted or
acquitted."; N.Y. Penal Law § 1938.
3. Section 1938 of the Penal Law provides that "An act or omission which is made
criminal and punishable in different ways, by different provisions of law, may be punished
under any one of those provisions, but not under more than one; and a conviction or
acquittal under one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other
provision."
4. People v. Snyder, 241 N.Y. 81, 148 N.E. 796 (1925); People v. Repola, 280 App.
Div. 735, 117 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1st Dep't 1952), aff'd, 305 N.Y. 740, 113 N.E,2d 42 (1953).
5. See: Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense, and Double Jeopardy, 58 Yale L.J. 513
(1949); Note 7 Brooklyn L.R. 79 (1938).
